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I. INTRODUCTION
Graphical analysis is often used
as an aid for undemanding insurance
casing decisions, a standard graphical cool
employed in che analysis of
France pureeing decisions is based on
the representation of preferences
£or wealth in che wealth^tillty
plane; i.e. a graph wllh final
wealth given
by the abscissa and the utility
of wealth given as che ordlnace
of points on
the graph. Unfortunately,
chis graph is cumbersome Co use
in illuscracing
partial Insurance coverage (see
Schlesinger 11983]).
ta alternative graphical
presentation is based on a diagram in
which
the axes depicc the levels of
final wealth realised in the
respecclve states
o£ the world." This state-clai»s
approach was used, for example by
Ehrlich
and Becxer [1977,. Rothchild and
Stiglit, [1976] and Stiglitz [1977,
in their
classic analyses of insurance
equilibrium Despite ics simplicity,
this
approach appears to be less popular
in research and teaching than
the
traditional utility analysis.
The purpose of this note is mainly
pedagogical and intended Co show how
several insurance concepts are easily
illustrated in a state-claims
framework, where insurance is being
viewed as a contingent claim. The
results are neither new nor exhaustive
in examining insurance theorems
that
can be illustrated using the
state-claims approach; but thev are.
hopefully,
<a* c efficient new insights into consumer
presented in a manner that provides
su ficie s
choice in the insurance market.
Both the standard utility approach,
and the state-claims model often
£oCus on a simple two-state world in
which either a total loss occurs or
no
loss at all. This simplification allows
easy illustration of some of the
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1» results existing In the Insurance literature. Being confined to a two-
state world, however, sterilizes some of
the real life aspects - e.g., the
distinction between coinsurance and deductible-type
policies disappears In
such an environment.
The paper sets up the simple state-claims
framework and uses It to
examine how the level of Insurance purchased
changes when the price of
insurance changes. We first consider the case
of no fixed loading fees as In
Ehrlich and Becker [1972], while using a slightly
different framework. We
then extend the analysis to the case where
the premium incudes a fixed as
well as a proportional loading. Next it
Is shown how Increased risk aversion
leads to the purchase of more coverage.
The last application examines the
purchase of Insurance when individuals have
state-dependent preferences.
II. THE STATE-CLAIMS FRAMEWORK
Consider a risk averse Individual with initial
wealth W that Is subject
to a possible loss L, (0 < L < W). with
probability of loss p > 0. The
individual's preferences are represented by the
increasing, strictly concave,
twice-differentiable von Neumann-Morgenstern utility
of final wealth, U(Y),
where Y denotes the final random wealth. We
restrict our analysis to allow
for only two possible outcomes. In particular,
let
r y - w with probability 1-p
Y.J
' (0
I y = W-L with probability p.
The wealth levels in the definitional equation (1)
represent final
wealth in the absence of any insurance.
We assume that insurance is available, and
the consumer selects the
amount of insurance by choosing a coinsurance
level, a. The premium, l(.),
is based on a common formula, which has fixed
and proportional loading
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elements:
(2)
n(a) - (l+X)apL + Y,
where:
1= * nr- the insurer pays aL in the event of
a loss and
a = coinsurance factor. w
the insured retains (1 -a)L of the
loss,
X = a loading factor (X i 0),
and
Y = fixed cost per contract
(Y 2 0)
.
blowing a purchase of such an insurance
policy rhe individual's fine!
wealth is:
y = W-n(o) with
Probability L-p
Y -
y 2
= H(«)-(H)L wich ProabiliCy p * (3)
III. THE LEVEL OF INSURANCE
PURCHASED
The above framework can be used to
analize the opitmal level of
insurance, a. To illustrate the use
of state-claims tecniques, first
consider the question of whether or
not full coverage is desirable,
which is
probably the most common use of
state-claims analysis. We shall
distinguish
between two pricing situations:
a. No Fixed loading fee
Assume that there is no fixed loading
charge for insurance, i.e., r =
0.
Point E in Figure 1. depicts the levels
of final wealth in the two states
of
the world where no insurance is bought
(the situation described in equation
1). At this point the consumer has a
wealth of W with a probability l-p
(state 1). and a wealth of W-L with a probability p
(state 2). A situation
of certainty is represented by the
case where the consumer has the
same
wealth in both states, i.e.. a point on
the «• line (the "certainty line").
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The consumer may change his initial position by purchasing insurance.
Buying full coverage would bring him to a point G on the certainty line. In
order to reach this situation he pays the premium (l+X)pL (equation 2) in
state 1, and his net gain in state 2 is the insurance benefit minus the
premium (i.e., L - (l+X)pL). Consequently, the slope of line EF which passes
through G equals - [1 - (1+X)p ]/ ( 1+X)p. Points along EF lying between E and
G represent partial coverage where the coinsurance factor, a, increases
monotonically as we go from E to G. Indeed, for any point on EF , such as H,
the level of coverage is represented by a = d(E,H)/d(E,G), where d(«,»)
represents the distance between two points (i.e., the standard Euclidean
metric. A proof appears in the Appendix.)
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
Let us consider whether or not G is optimal by considering what would
happen if we were at G and then decided to reduce the level of coverage by a
small amount. In general, the individual's marginal rate of substitution
between one dollar in state 1 and one dollar in state 2 is
(l-p)U' (y )/pU' (y _). 2 Since y = y„ at G, this implies a marginal rate of
substitution of (l~p)/p. This is not only true at G, but at all contingent
claims along the certainty line. This mathematical property is referred to
as "ray homotheticity"* along the certainty line.
If coverage is reduced from G by a small amount, the insurance market
allows trading of state 1 wealth for state 2 wealth at a rate of
[1-(1+X)p]/(1+X)p. This rate equals the subjective marginal rate of
substitution (l-p)/p, only when the insurers do not charge any loading on top
of the expected loss (i.e., X=0, in addition to our assumption that y=0) .
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Thus, m the case of no fixed loading a full
coverage is desirable only when
insurance is priced according to the policy's
actuarial value, (1=0).
The curve U^ in Figure 1 illustrates the so-called indifference
curve
that includes G. This curve represents the
locus of contingent claims that
yield the individual the same expected
utility as G. If the individual is
strictly risk averse, this curve will be
strictly convex to the origin (see
Appendix.) It is easy to show that the claims
lying southwest of this curve
represent lower expected utility. Thus, as
drawn, G is preferred to E. That
is, full coverage is preferred to no
coverage. This need not necessarily be
crue, and It is generally possible for G to
yield a lower expected utility
Chan E.
In the case where there is a positive proportional
loading, (X > 0), the
subjective substitution rate at point G is larger than the
objective (market)
rate of substitution. Equality of the objective and
subjective rate may only
happen at a point Southeast of 6. In the case
illustrated, the expected-
utility- maximizing level of insurance would leave
the individual with claim
H where the consumer's marginal rate of substitution
of wealth between the
no-loss and loss states is the same as the ratio of
market prices for the two
states. In other words, partial coverage is optimal.
This well-known result
is usually attributed to Mossin [1968] and Smith
[1968].
The optimal level of coverage is
(4)
a* - d(E,H)/d(E,G) v
The change from the initial position at E is charcterized
as follows:
d(E,J) - premium paid for coverage - (l+X)pa*L
d(H,J) = net indemnity in the loss state (net of premium)
» a*L-(l+X)pa*L
d(E,J) + d(H,J) - total insurance indemnity - <**L.
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Due to the convexity of the indifference curve passing through H, U U
,
o o
it mist lie everywhere above EG. In particular, it must lie above both
points E and G so that partial coverage (point H) is better than no coverage
as well as full coverage and hence is a global optimum. For a higher loading
factor, A, the slope of EG would change, and the optimum H would tend to be
closer to point E, as we will show shortly. Note that if X is high enough,
"no insurance" may become the constrained optimum. If we allow a < 0, then
such an a can be optimal for high enough X so that the insured "goes short"
in insurance. This peculiar solution is not like insurance in the usual
sense, but is not unsimilar to writing an option rather than buying one. 2
b. Premiums include a fixed loading fee (y > 0).
Now supposed that the premium includes a fixed loading fee (y > 0)
,
where the premium is given by (2). For the sake of comparison, assume that
X > and is the same as in Figure 1. If any insurance is to be purchased, a
fixed fee of y must be paid. The opportunity of post-insurance wealth levels
is given by the line E'F 1 in Figure 2, which is parallel to EF (with the same
slope -[1-(1+X)p]/(1+A)p). E' is derived by deducting y from E in both
states of the world. Of course E' itself is not a legitimate final outcome,
since the consumer who prefers to purchase no insurance will not agree to pay
the loading y. However, along the opportunity locus, E',F', we can, once
again, find the optimal level of coverage, at point H'. In general, H 1 can
entail either a higher, lower, or the same level of coverage, o, as does H.
Any difference in coverage is due to what is known in economic terras as the
"income effect" (substracting y from wealth in all states).
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE
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H 1 may offer a lower level of expected utility than E (see Figure 2).
I.e., although H' is the optimal claim (conditional on the payment of y)» the
individual may be better off by not purchasing any insurance and "going
bare", so to speak, thus, remaining at E. Whether or not "going bare" is the
optimal decision depends on the magnitude of the fixed loading Y, and on the
individual's preferences.
If X - 0, but y > 0, then the marginal price of insurance equals its
actuarial value so that full coverage is optimal if any coverage is purchased
at all. In this case, y is the expected profit of the insurer. Whether or
not full coverage is preferred to no coverage depends on whether or not y is
"too large". In this case, "too large" means that y exceeds the Arrow-Pratt
risk premium for E (See Stiglitz [1977], Schlesinger [1983].)
c. Changing the price of insurance
If the loading parameters y and X, are changed, it is likely that the
optimal level of coverage will also change. Small changes in y can result in
quite drastic changes in coverage levels as the consumer goes from no
coverage to some positive level, or vice versa. Small changes in X can have
the same effect when y > 0. However, when y « 0, the level of coverage is a
continuous function of X and small changes in X do not cause drastic jumps In
the level of coverage. Note, that there is no guarantee that o must be
monotonically decreasing with X: it is possible to have an increase in
coverage as X increases, although this is not particularly likely. (See Hoy
and Robson [1981] and Borch [1985]).
An example of such an occurrence is illustrated in Figure 3. As X
increases the individual is offered contracts along EG" rather than EG. It
is easy to show that the policy whose contingent claim representation lies
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closest to the 45° certainty line (where "closest" is measured via
perpendicular distance) has the higher level of coverage.' Drawing a 45°
line through H, it can be seen that the optimal claim H" along EG" contains a
higher level of coverage than does H. Consequently, more insurance is
purchased along EG", even though the price for every level of coverage is
proportionately higher. However, since a = 1 when X = and since a = for
high enough X, the coverage level is a monotonic decreasing function of X in
some neighborhood of X = 0, and for high enough X.
INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE
IV. CHANGES IN RISK AVERSION
For a higher level of risk, aversion, the level of coverage will increase
(unless coverage is already full, a = 1) H . Also, for a fixed X, the smallest
y that will induce "no coverage" as an optimum will increase with the
individual's level of risk aversion. 5 Both of these results become obvious
in the state-claims framework, once the effects of increased risk aversion on
individual preferences are understood.'
A utility function V(Y) is said to be more risk averse than U(Y) if V is
more concave than U; i.e., if there exists a twice differentiable function
g, such that
V(Y) - g[U(Y)]
,
g' > o, g" < 0. T
Now consider the marginal rate of substitution between state 1 claims and
state 2 claims for utilities U and V. For y. > y 2 ,
(l-p)U'(Y )
MRS
u
- pU ' (Y
2 )
< 5 >
g
, [U(Y
1
)] (1-P )U'(Y
1
)
* g
' LUlx
2
)j * P u
' tV " MRSy
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since g is concave. If Y = Y , MRS = MRS ; and if Y < Y. , MRS < MRS .° 12uv 1 2 u v
The implications of (5) and the corresponding conditions for Y < x are
that the indifference curve for V is tangent to that for U at any certainty
claim, such as A in Figure 4. Furthermore, the indifference curve for V is
more convex, lying everywhere above that for U except at the point of
tangency. The indifference curve for V passing through point B in Figure 4,
for example, would have a flatter slope at B than does the curve U.
Restricting ourselves to Y > Y
2
it is easy to use (5) to prove the two
claims made at the beginning of this section.
INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE
V. STATE-DEPENDENT PREFERENCES
As a final illustration of state-claims techniques for simple insurance
modelling, we consider the case where preferences themselves differ in the
two states of the world. Insurance purchasing when preferences are state
dependent can be readily viewed using the state-claims approach. 9 To this
end, we express preferences via the function U(Y,6) where 8 = 1 or 2,
indicating which of the two states occurs. Although it is not necessary, we
assume that the individual has a distaste for state 2, apart from wealth
considerations, (i.e., that U(Y,1) > U(Y,2) for all Y). For example, it
might be that state 2 involves the loss of an "irreplaceable commodity" with
a sentimental value in addition to its market value.' We let U'(Y,8) denote
3U(Y,6)/3Y and assume that U' > and U" < for both =1 and 6=2, and for
all values of Y.
For simplicity, consider only the case of insurance sold at its
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actuarial value, (i.e., the insurance premium is given by equation (2) with
X = y " 0)« Extensions to the cases of positive loadings are
straightforward. Consider the available insurance contracts, which are
represented by the segment EG in Figure 5, having a slope -(l-p)/p. When
preferences were state independent, full coverage (point G) was optimal. In
the current case, the individual's marginal rate of substitution of state 1
claims for state 2 claims at full coverage G, is
(l-p)U'(Y ,1)
MRS "
P u
' (v
2
,2) <
6 >
In general U'(Y,1) can be greater, less than, or equal to U'(Y,2) for any
particular value of Y. If, for example, marginal utility is lower for each
wealth level in the loss state (state 2), then the subjective marginal rate
of substitution at G is greater than the market prices ratio (MRS > (l-p)/p)
and consequently less than full coverage should be purchased. Indeed, it
follows that the optimal level of coverage must entail contingent claims
where U'(Y ,1) = U'(Y ,2), such as at point H in Figure 5. The locus of all
contingent claims satisfying this condition is called the "reference set" of
U, (denoted by RS(U)), an example of which appears in Figure 5. 10 The
reference set represents all contingent claims with equal marginal utilities
in both states of nature, whereas the certainty line has described the
situations with equal wealth in both states.
INSERT FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE
In general, RS(U) must not lie entirely below the certainty line as
drawn in Figure 5. If U'(Y,1) < U'(Y,2) for all Y, then RS(U) will lie
entirely above the certainty line. In such a case, more than 100 percent
coverage would be optimal, if such coverage is not prohibited.
An interesting oddity occurs if we consider an initial position
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somewhere between G and H on EG, rather than at E, and assume that
U'(Y,1) > U'(Y,2) once again. In such a case, the optimal contingent claims
contract would still be H, but the optimal level of a would be negative! That
is, the individual would be willing to pay an "indemnity" following a loss in
order to receive a "premium" that can be used when no loss occurs. It is not
difficult to explain situations in which such contracts might be desirable.
For example, consider a bachelor with no wife or children and no favorite
charities. Rather than be interested in a life insurance policy that pays if
he dies, this individual mi^.t be more interested in a contract that pays him
when he lives, and takes some of his assets at his time of death — an idea
that is not all that different from a life annuity contract.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In analyzing the workings of markets, it is always useful to have as
many tools as possible at one's disposal. In this paper,, we have shown how a
simple state-claims analysis can often lead to clearer insights
and understandings of certain market principles for the purchase of
insurance. Hopefully, such insights can lead to new hypotheses about how
insurance markets work.
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FOOTNOTES
L. See, for example, Hlrshleifer [1966] and Hirshleifer and Riley [1979],
>. This rate of substitution is easily obtained by setting the expected
utility equal to a constant.
\, A negative a entails the consumer making a net payment contingent on his
or her own loss in return for a payment in the no loss state. This
occurs only when X is high enough to compensate for the extra risk
involved in such a contract.
This was shown by Schlesinger [1981]
i a This result, as far as we know, is not published anywhere, although it
is too straightforward to be considered particularly significant.
The details of the proofs are left to the reader.
. The measure of risk aversion at a particular wealth level is
r = -U'(Y)/U'(Y). See Pratt [1964], and Kihlstrom and Mirman [1974].
There are many papers on state-dependent preferences. The state-claims
approach with state dependent utilities is basically discussed in Cook
and Graham [1977]. The model used here is similar to that of Kami
[1983], although Kami does not model insurance purchasing per se.
See Cook and Graham [1977], Schlesinger [1984] and Shioshansi [1983],
0. This notion is due to Kami [1983].
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APPENDIX
A. Proof that a - d(E,H, )/d(E,G).
Let H denote the contingent claim following the purchase of insurance.
If H=G or H=E, the proof is trivial. So assume that H lies strictly between
E and G as in figure 1. Now, as labeled in figure 1, triangles EJH and EKG
are similar triangles. Also, we argued in the text that <aL=d(E,J) + d(J,H).
In a similar manner, it is trivially seen that L=d(E,K) + d(K,G). But the
ratio =-L/L is then equivalent to the sura of the legs of right triangles EJH
divided by those of EKG. Since we have similar triangles, the ratio of
hypoteneuses must have the same ratio, which proves the claim.
B. Proof that risk averse preferences imply convex indifference curves.
This follows if we can show that expected utility is a quasiconcave
function of (Y^Y^. To this end, suppose (Y^Y^ = (X^X^ + (1- KZ-.Z^,
where (X ,X ) and (Z ,Z ) yield the same expected utility and where 1.
We need only to show that (Y
,
Y ) yields a higher expected utility. Now,
EUCY^Y^ = (l-p)U( X
l
+ (1- )ZJ + pU( X2 + (1- )Z 2 )
(l-p)[ U(X
X
) + (1- )U(Z
1
)] + p[ U(X
2
) + (1- )U(Z
2
)]
= EU(X
X
,X
2
) + (1- )EU(Z r Z 2 ),
where the inequality follows from the strict concavity of U.
Since EU(X
X
,X
2
) = ElKZ^Z^, we are done.
C. Proof that the state claim lying closer to the certainty line entails a
higher level of insurance coverage.
We show this only for the case where » 0. The case where is
easy and is left to the reader. First, suppose that for two different
values, we obtain claims H and H 1
, equidistant from the certainty line. This
is drawn in Figure A. Since triangles EHH 1 and EGG' are similar triangles,
State 2
Wealth
(y2 ) ^Certainty
Line
State!
,
Wealth
(y,)
Figure A
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it follows from part A of this appendix that H and H' represent claims with
identical levels of coverage. The claim now follows trivially from part A of
the appendix.
INSERT FIGURE A ABOUT HERE
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